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Abstract
Legitimacy of international investment law is in crisis. One particular area of international
investment law that has been progressively re-developed is the area of investment dispute
settlement. The EU sees the multilateral investment court as a proper solution to reform ISDS
in the future. To achieve this final goal, starting from the bilateral level, the EU has included
investment court provisions as an ISDS mechanism in its latest trade and investment agreement
with its trading partners, among others, EU-Viet Nam FTA and IPA, as well as EU-Singapore
FTA & IPA. This paper addresses central questions on how could existing investment court
system in EU and ASEAN member states’ Investment Protection Agreements (IPA) can be
expanded towards multilateral investment court in the future, and what are the challenges that
can be expected from such expansion. It critically analyses concluded agreements between the
EU and some of ASEAN Member States. I argue that for now, it is unlikely that multilateral
investment court expansion will happen soon considering the challenges and concerns expressed
by both sides.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legitimacy of international investment law is in crisis. One particular
area of international investment law that has been progressively redeveloped is the area of investment dispute settlement. Backlashes
and criticism of existing traditional investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS) from the society driven the demand to reform of the system.
Critics attack the ISDS system based on several arguments, among
others, arbitrator impartiality and ethical issues, divergent decision
based over the similar factual circumstances, irreversible erroneous
decision, nationality shopping by the investor, high costs proceeding,
lack of transparency and so forth.1 Several incremental steps to reform
have been taken to reform the system, including the enhancement of
UNCTAD, Improving Investment Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Policy Tools, IIA
Issue Note, issue no. 4, November 2017, 8.
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transparency in ISDS through UNCITRAL’s initiative of Mauritius
Convention,2 as well as undergoing amendment efforts of ICSID rules
and regulation.3 But more radical change is coming to replace the
entire system through the establishment permanent institution so-called
multilateral investment court, proposed by the European Union (EU).4
The EU sees the multilateral investment court as a proper solution
to reform ISDS in the future.5 To achieve this goal, EU has started from
the bilateral level with EU’s trading partners, through the inclusion of
investment court provisions as the prevailing ISDS mechanism in its
latest trade and investment agreement. The first agreement to include
such provisions is the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA),6 and the second being EU-Viet Nam Free Trade
and Investment Protection Agreement.7 Just recently, the EU also signed
the FTA-IPA with Singapore in October 2018,8 which also contain the
investment court system (ICS) provisions. In addition, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP) which is still under negotiation
with the US will likely to feature ICS.9 Albeit the differences in some
parts of the provisions, investment disputes procedure across the EUnegotiated treaties has the common elements as proposed by the EU,
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (adopted 10
December 2004) UNTS 54749 (Mauritius Convention)
3
ICSID, ‘ICSID Rules and Regulations Amendment Process,’ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments> accessed 8 March 2019.
4
European Union, ‘Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UNCITRAL Working Group III,’ (18 January 2019) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf> accessed 12 March 2019.
5
Cecilia Malmström, ‘A Multilateral Investment Court: a contribution to the
conversation
about
reform
of
investment
dispute
settlement’ (European Commission, 22 November 2018), < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2018/november/tradoc_157512.pdf> accessed 8 March 2019.
6
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the
one part, and the European Union and Its Member States
7
The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member
States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part concluded December 2015, entry into force 2018
8
The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member
States of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part
9
European Commission, ‘The Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership: Making Trade Work for You,’ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/> accessed 8
March 2019
2
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namely, presence of standing tribunal member, the division proceeding
between first instance and appeal tribunal, inception of ethical rules
for arbitration, disclosure of finding, and so forth.10 Thus, through the
recent efforts by the EU, we can see that investment court system is
already in its test drive phase, marking the radical reform of ISDS that
is taking place gradually.
A regional organisation such as ASEAN could be the stepping-stone
towards the establishment of multilateral investment court. Other than
Singapore and Viet Nam, some of ASEAN member states are still in
negotiation with the EU with regard to trade and investment agreement.11
In the recent EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, both organisations
expressed the adherence to multilateralism and commitment for creation
of EU-ASEAN FTA in future.12 Therefore, it is interesting to see the
development of investment court from inter-regional cooperation
perspective. This paper addresses central questions on how could existing
investment court system in EU and ASEAN member states’ Investment
Protection Agreements (IPA) can be expanded towards multilateral
investment court in the future, and what are the challenges that can
be expected from such expansion. It critically analyses concluded
agreements between the EU and the ASEAN Member States, among
others, EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore IPA, and agreements which
are still undergoing negotiation such as Indonesia-EU Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (IEU-CEPA).
EU approach of ISDS reform indeed has been commented many

Kyle Dylan Dickson-Smith, ‘Does the European Union Have New Clothes?: Understanding the EU’s New Investment Treaty Mode’ (2016) 773 Journal of World
Investment & Trade 17, 774
11
Among others, Indonesia (ongoing), Philippines (ongoing, Myanmar (ongoing),
Malaysia (ongoing), Thailand (postponed). See European Commission, ‘Overview
of FTA and other Trade Negotiations,’ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/
december/tradoc_118238.pdf> accessed 8 March 2019.
12
European Union External Action, ‘Joint statement of the 22nd EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting’ (European Union External Action, 22 January 2019) <https://eeas.
europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/56912/joint-statement-22nd-eu-asean-ministerial-meeting_en> accessed 8 March 2019.
10
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times in the scholarship recently.13 However, the discussion on the
prospect to expand ICS into a multialteral investment court is not a
recurring discussion, particularly from the perspective of Asian
countries. Therefore, this paper serves to fill the gap in the literature.
This paper will be divided as follows, in the first part it will address
the EU’s reform initiatives. While in the second part, it mainly
discusses the investment court system from the ASEAN (Member
States) perspective. In the concluding part, I will deliver the conclusion
that multilateral investment court is a promising proposal to tackle
the concerns over ISDS and replace the ISDS mechanism. However,
challenges are coming from either side of EU and ASEAN in terms of
multiplication of ICS in the future investment protection agreement.
Plus, the inconsistency of EU practice with Japan may discourage
further participation of ASEAN Member States in participating in EU’s
project in establishing multilateral investment court in the future. Thus,
it is unlikely that multilateral investment court expansion will happen
soon considering these challenges.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTMENT COURT SYSTEM
As briefly mentioned above, the Investment Court System is a
reform proposed by the EU. The rationale for reform was driven by the
backlashes and criticism from the society against the prevailing ISDS
mechanism to solve the foreign investment disputes. This part elaborates
those criticisms and arguments against current ISDS mechanism
employed by various IIA, and how the EU proposal to reform ISDS
by creating ‘investment court system’ become a realisation through the
bilateral agreements.
A. CRITICISM OF EXISTING ISDS
About half of century ago, the ISDS mechanism was created to
overcome the shortcomings of available avenue for an investor to
protect its investment in the developing countries from the interference
of the host state. Inter-state dispute settlement through enabled by
See Dickson-Smith, note 10; Umair Ghori, ‘The International Investment Court
System: The Way Forward for Asia,’ (2018) 205 International Trade & Business Law
Review 21, 209.
13
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diplomatic protection of investor’s government involves a lot of chains
of bureaucracy and consumes time. But on the other hand, resolution
of the dispute through the host state’s domestic court did not promise
a fair and impartial process, as alleged by investors. Consequently,
dispute settlement mechanism that allows the investor to directly raise
a claim against the host state government through arbitration channel
was considered an innovative solution at that time. However, time
and circumstances changed and the ISDS mechanism considered not
suitable anymore.
Through the course of its existence, we have seen ISDS mechanism
judged the state’s macroeconomic policy during the crisis with
inconsistent decisions,14 proceedings that took years to resolve15 and
costs millions of dollars for both parties. These controversial cases were
mainly ‘judged’ by relatively small pool of arbitrator, which due to
their lack of diversity being called “pale, male, and stale” club.16 Some
arbitrators’ lack of public interest lenses contributed to the decision
that often undermined and overlooked the right to regulate of the host
country.17 Rules of international investment law that scattered across
the international investment agreements (IIAs) without any precedent
rules binding the arbitrator also created open norm interpretation that
often went far-fetched and created uncertainty. Even some of the
interpretations of IIA provisions went against the initial intention of
concluding States. These criticisms and shortcomings pushed the call
for reform of existing ISDS mechanism.
Several states adopted different attitudes and policy options with
regard to ISDS that bound upon them. First policy option is to terminate
the IIAs and withdraw from agreements that enabled ISDS proceeding.

This refers to series of ISDS litigation faced by Argentina
Victor Pey Casado case took 17 years to resolve. See Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2.
16
Adrian Lai, ‘ISDS Reform Conference: Mapping the Way Forward Discussion Paper for the Session on Appointment of Arbitrators and Related Issues’ (ISDS Reform
Conference – Mapping the Way Forward, Hong Kong, 13 February 2019), 18
17
Stephan W. Schill, ‘Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Conceptual
Framework and Options for the Way Forward’ E15 Task Force on Investment Policy
Think Piece, July 2015, 2
14
15
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Indonesia terminated BITs with its partners in 2014,18 the reason is
most likely to limit the exposure to ISDS claim. Even more extreme
policy was taken by Venezuela by withdrawing from ICSID in 2012.19
Some other states working towards the ISDS reform that pushes for
strengthened institutionalisation, including by introducing appeal
mechanism to create check and recheck mechanism for ISDS ruling.
The EU and the US had indicated the adherence to introduce appeal
mechanism modeled after the success of WTO Appellate Body.20 The
appeal mechanism is crucial to ensure coherence and predictability
of international investment law. Further, the reform of ISDS can also
be enabled by increasing transparency by allowing participation of
non-disputing parties’ amicus curiae. A major initiative to reform the
transparency is the introduction of Mauritius Convention that provides
an opt-in procedure for UNCITRAL Rules for Transparency. Arbitrator’s
ethics and accountability also proposed to be enhanced the introduction
of a strong code of conduct and ethical rules. The discussion of reform is
underway at the international level through UNCTAD and UNCITRAL
(Working Group III) as the platforms of stakeholders’ discussion on the
matter of ISDS reform.21
B. EU PROPOSAL OF ISDS REFORM
Lisbon Treaty mandated EU matter of foreign direct investment
to be under a broadened Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the
Union.22 Since then, the EU has been progressively negotiating trade
and investment agreement with its trading partners, proposing the
EU’s own approach on an investment agreement on behalf of EU
Member States.23 EU Member States are not involved in negotiations
Anthony Crockett, ‘The Termination of Indonesia’s BITs: Changing the Bathwater,
but Keeping the Baby?’ (2017) 836 The Journal of Investment and Trade 18, 837.
19
IISD, ‘Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve’
(IISD, 13 April 2012) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawalfrom-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/> accessed 8 March 2019.
20
Schill, (n. 16), 8.
21
UNCTAD (n. 1).
22
Treaty of LisbonAmending theTreaty on European Union and theTreaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 of 17 December 2007.
23
August Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path, Quo Vadis Europe: The Future
of EU BITs and Other Investment Agreements’ (2013) 111 Santa Clara Journal of
International Law12, 124.
18
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of IIAs, instead it is the Commission in Brussels that conclude the
IIAs. However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued Opinion
2/15 which determined that investment protection and ISDS section
of EU-Singapore FTA are outside of EU CCP competence.24 Meaning
that agreements which contain the ISDS provision is not an exclusive
competition of EU, but rather, it must be negotiated and agreed along
with EU member states as a “mixed agreement”. This sets the precedent
for the following EU’s trade and investment agreement negotiation
practice with its partners.25 In the negotiation with its trading partners,
EU always promotes ‘the gold standard’ for investment protection
that goes beyond lowest common denominator, but at the same time,
the EU attempt to preserves the right to regulate of the State.26 Public
consultation held in 2014 during the TTIP negotiation yields to more
than 150,000 replies from the public, which particularly addressed the
concerns over the need to introduce tribunal of the second instance to
promote correctness in ISDS decision, thus this fuelled the Commission
to conclude ‘reformed’ IIAs in the future.27
The push for better ISDS also called by the European Parliament. In
July, it adopted a resolution urging the Commission to replace existing
ISDS mechanism with a new better mechanism which is transparent,
independent judges-ruled, and contain a limitation of private interests
so that they could not defeat the public policy objectives. 28 Within
the same year, the EU published a concept paper titled “Investment in
TTIP and beyond – the path for reform.”29 In this paper it was revealed
that the new investment and trade agreements with partner countries,
Canada and Singapore, will feature the new approach aimed for ISDS
reform. Key points of the initiatives directly addressed the criticism
ECJ, Opinion 2/15 of the Court, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376
Marise Cremona, ‘Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May
2017’ (2018) 231 European Constituional Law Review 14, 233.
26
Reinisch, (n. 22) 124.
27
Catherine Titi, ‘The European Union’s Proposal for an International Investment
Court: Significance, Innovations and Challenges Ahead,’ (2016) Transnational Dispute Management 1
28
Ibid., 3.
29
European Commission, ‘Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path
for reform’ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF>
accessed 12 March 2019
24
25
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and shortcomings of existing ISDS framework. Proposed mechanism
excludes the possibility of forum shopping by imposes strict ‘real business
operation’ condition requirement to establish the jurisdiction of dispute
settlement; strict government-controlled rule interpretation reference;
ethics rules and code of conduct for arbitrator; early dismissals and
fast track system that disallows frivolous claims; introduction of “loser
pays principle”; introduction of appeal mechanism; and prohibition of
parallel proceedings.30
Presently, the texts of the agreement are already apparent, it has
indeed laid down the EU’s vision of ISDS reform. The new agreements
which include the EU’s proposal are among others, EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), EU-Singapore
FTA-IPA, EU-Viet Nam FTA-IPA. However, with regard to its
investment and investment dispute part, no case has been submitted
under the new mechanism.

II. BUILDING MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT:
ASEAN PERSPECTIVE
Relationship of the EU and ASEAN as regional organisations
has always been a strategic one. In 2016, Commission sought the
authorisation from the Council to negotiate the free trade agreement
with ASEAN, and the authorisation was issued on the condition where
it could not reach the agreement with ASEAN, the negotiation would
proceed with each of ASEAN Member States bilaterally. 31 Recently, the
EU and ASEAN expressed its commitment to continue the negotiation
of EU-ASEAN FTA which aims for expansion of inter-regional trade,
business, and investment.32 As we recall, the EU has concluded the
negotiation of FTA-IPA with Singapore and Viet Nam, therefore further
expansion of trade and investment agreement would be foreseeable.
However, whether it will feature ICS as a substitute for existing ISDS
mechanism, is till questionable. This section attempts to assess the ICS
Ibid., 2-3.
ECJ, (n. 23)
32
European Union External Action, ‘ASEAN-EU Action Plan 2018-2022’ <https://
eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/56912/joint-statement-22ndeu-asean-ministerial-meeting_en> accessed 8 March 2019.
30
31
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proposal and multilateral investment court from the lens of ASEAN and
its Member States.
A. ASEAN EXPERIENCE OF ISDS AND CALL FOR
REFORM
ASEAN consisted of a pool of developing and less-developed
countries. The Member States regard foreign direct investment as a
key component to boost the development nationally and regionally.33
Thus, a domestic and regional regulation policy that modeled to attract
investment still prevails in the region. It is important to note that even
though ASEAN has the competence to conclude an investment treaty,34
the agreement does not have direct effect, unlike EU-concluded treaties
that directly enforceable to Member States. Despite the ASEAN’s
power to engage in external relations, each of ASEAN Member States
also has and still actively engaged in the conclusion of IIAs with each
own trading partners. Malaysia has the most IIAs at hand with 91 IIAs,
second and third being Singapore and Viet Nam respetively.35 In terms
of investment dispute settlement, with the exception of Singapore,
Cambodia, and Brunei, all ASEAN Member States have faced investors’
lawsuit through ISDS mechanism as a respondent state.
Indonesia in 2014 reviewed and terminated IIAs that are concluded
between 1960s and 1990s.36 This move is high likely to minimise
the risk of exposure from ISDS. Even stronger call for Indonesia to
withdraw from ICSID also expressed by a commentator.37 Even
though strong opposition of ISDS remains, let alone withdrawing
from ICSID, Indonesia is still continuing to conclude IIAs with ISDS
ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat),
p. 44.
34
ASEAN Charter, Art. 41.7. “ASEAN may conclude agreements with countries or
sub-regional, regional and international organisations and institutions.”
35
UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Hub’ <https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org> accessed 8 March 2019
36
David Price, ‘Indonesia’s Bold Strategy on Bilateral Investment Treaties: Seeking
an Equitable Climate for Investment?’ (2017) 124 Asian Journal of International Law
7, 124.
37
Hikmahanto Juwana, ‘Indonesia Should Withdraw from the ICSID!’ (Jakarta Post,
2 April 2014) <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/02/indonesia-should-withdraw-icsid.html> accessed 14 March 2019.
33
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provision within it,38 but in a more careful manner.39 Inclusion of ISDS
provisions justified by the need to attract foreign investment according
to Indonesia’s policy approach.40 Similar tone also observable with
Malaysian practice. Despite Malaysia’s experience with ISDS, it chooses
not to abandon the ISDS system entirely but taking a more cautious
and careful approach in drafting future IIAs. Malaysia seek future IIAs
which could better in balancing the State’s right to regulate of and the
interests of investor.41 While Thailand in UNICTRAL Working Group
III submitted its position with regard to ISDS reform. It addressed the
issue of ethical concern of arbitrator, third-party funding, incoherent
treaty interpretation and calls for capacity building and legal assistance
for developing countries as can be found in WTO dispute settlement
through Advisory Centre for WTO Law (ACWL).42
Preference to ISDS mechanism is still apparent in the ASEAN’s
investment treaty. In the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement43 for
instance, ISDS provision still exists although crafted cautiously and
modernised. It features incremental enhancement such as expertise
requirement for the third arbitrator, limited transparency rule.44 In
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), it still has
the ISDS provision. The disputes under ACIA are not exclusively
only can be submitted to arbitration institutions such as ICSID or ad
hoc under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, or Kuala Lumpur’s Regional
Centre for Arbitration, but also the provision acknowledge the recourse
to a domestic administrative tribunal.45 The agreement also attempted
to create transparency rules for parties to publish awards and decision
J. J. Losari & M. Ewing-Chow, ‘Regional Considerations - Reflective or Reactionary? Indonesia’s Approaches to International Investment Agreements and Recommendations for the Future,’ (2015) Transnational Dispute Management 12.
39
Crockett, (n. 17), 844.
40
UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.156
41
Sufian Jusoh, Muhammad Faliq Abd Razak, Mohamad Azim Mazlan, ‘Malaysia
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Learning From Experience’ (2017) 890 Journal of World Investment and Trade 18, 916.
42
UNCITRAL, ‘Possible reform of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) Comments by the Government of Thailand A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.147
43
The Agreement on Investment Under The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (ASEAN-India)
44
Ibid., Art. 20.16 & 20.17.
45
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Art. 33
38
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publicly, but with a weak “may” clause.46 Other than that, the two
agreements contain typical provisions of ISDS without significant
difference but tailored in a more detailed way. Despite the concern and
experience of some ASEAN Member States over the past practice of
ISDS, there is no significant breakthrough to introduce reform of ISDS,
at least in intra-ASEAN level. This situation is more or less can be
regarded as preference to status quo of existing ISDS rules. Therefore,
the invitation of ISDS reform by EU through the inclusion of ICS
mechanism under the investment agreement can be seen as a positive
sign for ASEAN to reform the ISDS in the future.
B. ICS IN EU-VIET NAM AND EU-SINGAPORE IPA
With the conclusion of EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore IPA, for
EU, the ICS and ISDS reform is not a theoretical debate anymore.
Despite negotiated in a bilateral manner by each party, dispute
settlement sections of both IPAs have similarity and followed a
common structure. However, there are slight differences in the wording
of the ISDS provisions, for instance, EU-Viet Nam IPA clearly excludes
the application of Most Favoured Nations (MFN) rule to dispute
settlement, while for EU-Singapore IPA, it does not feature MFN clause
at all. Consequently, the ICS provisions on both agreements cannot be
applied cross-ASEAN member states.47 Regarding the scope of dispute
settlement, EU-Viet Nam IPA put a stricter measure to exclude fraudulent
investment from accessing the dispute settlement, but in contrast, a
similar clause is absent in EU-Singapore IPA.48 Both agreements adhere
to amicable dispute resolution, which enables the parties to settle the
dispute through agreement at any time of the dispute.49 The time frame
of dispute also slightly different in both agreements. Both parties can
enter the consultation, in case of EU-Singapore IPA, within 30 months
starting since treatment breaching the obligation under the agreement
Ibid., Art. 39
The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (EU-Viet Nam IPA)
Art. 2.4.5
48
Ibid., Art. 3.27.2
49
The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part (EU-Singapore IPA)Art. 3.2; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.29.
46
47
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was known, or 10 years if local remedies were pursued. In the case of
EU-Viet Nam IPA, it should be within 3 years from the first breach, and
if local remedies pursued no later than 7 years.50
If no solution found in the consultation phase, the claimant can
bring the case to the tribunal of the first instance. The disputing parties
may choose arbitration rules either from ICSID Convention, ICSID
Additional Facilities Rules, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or any other
arbitral rules.51 Different from traditional arbitration procedure, the
disputing party bring the case to a standing tribunal which composes
from nationals of both parties of IPA, and third state nationals. However,
there are differences in terms of the size of Tribunal in each IPA. In
EU-Singapore, there are six persons of standing tribunal in total, where
two of them from EU Member States, two from Singapore, while two
others are from the third country, serving for eight years term. In EUViet Nam IPA, there are nine Tribunal members in total, with each party
appoint three persons serving for four years term.52 Because of the this
standing ‘court’-like nature, each of the members of Tribunal is entitled
to monthly retainer fee from each party, and the fee is administered by
ICSID Secretariat.53 However, the amount of retainer fee is unknown
from the text of the agreement. While for appeal Tribunal, both
agreements set six members with similar composition, but 8 years
terms for EU-Singapore IPA and four years for EU-Viet Nam IPA.54
Members of both Tribunals chosen by its qualification standard, must
be independent beyond doubt, and bound to ethics rule and comply with
the code of conduct.55
Disputing party can bring the ruling into appeal procedure within
90 days. The grounds of appeal are among others, manifest error in
interpretation or application of the law, and application of facts. In
addition to these grounds, annulment conditions set by Art. 52 ICSID
Convention is applicable mutatis mutandis.56 The appeal tribunal has
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

EU-Singapore IPA, Art, 3.3.3; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.30.
EU-Singapore IPA, Art. 39; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.33.2.
EU-Singapore IPA, Art, 3.9; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.38.2 & 3.38.5.
EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.9; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.38.14.
EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.10; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.39.
EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.11; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.40
EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.19; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.54.
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the power to modify even reverse the previous ruling.57 To discourage
frivolous claim, both ICS applies the principle of losing party pays.58
Other than disputing party, the third parties can be involved in the
proceeding as the non-disputing parties through amicus curiae
submission mechanism.59 In terms of procedure, the most significant
difference from both IPAs is the fact that EU-Viet Nam IPA has an anticircumvention mechanism that gives the power to Tribunal to reject
jurisdiction if forum shopping practice is prima facie foreseeable.60
Although similar, there are differences in the details ICS procedure
between the two agreements. But ICS procedure in both IPAs drew a
rough illustration of what multilateral investment court would like in the
future. The drafters of both agreements also included a unique clause to
future-proof the agreement, preparing towards the creation of multilateral
investment court.61 In EU-Singapore IPA, it is even more clearly stated
that both parties intend to pursue the creation of multilateral investment
court. The provision within EU-Singapore IPA stated the obligation to
actively “pursue with each other and other interested trading partners,
the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal.” In this sense,
the two agreements could serve as the building blocks in establishing a
multilateral investment court in the future.
IV. IT’S TIME TO JOIN FORCES WITH EU?
Bilateral negotiations of IPAs have become the laboratory for EU
to experimenting with its ISDS reform proposal. Up until now, the
implementation of ICS is still pending and there are no cases that brought
under the newly established mechanism. Thus, to this point empirical
experience of dispute settlement through ICS is practically absent.
Some commentators have argued theoretically that ICS would likely
to be incompatible with ICSID Convention, as ISDS reform through

57
58
59
60
61

EU-Singapore IPA,3.19; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.54.
EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.21; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.53.4.
EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.16 & 3.17; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.51.
EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.43. VN
EU-Singapore IPA, 3.12; EU-Viet Nam IPA 3.40.

465

Rizky Banyualam Permana

the establishment of ICS is criticised too fundamental and radical.62
However, on the other hand, at least the EU did not end up with status
quo favoring existing ISDS mechanism which has been proven to be
more problematic. The EU also has actively pushed towards the reform
involving other like-minded partner, even a commentator argued the
possibility that the ICS will become ‘the next inevitable paradigm’ in
foreign investment dispute settlement. 63
The success of making multilateral investment court obviously
dependant on the reaction of other EU’s partners. The EU as a global
economic bloc has the political influence towards its partners to support
its agenda. In order to achieve the multilateral investment court, interregional bloc cooperation should also be taken into account by EU. In
this case, involving ASEAN as an EU’s strategic economic partners
may help to agenda to build the EU’s dream. As mentioned earlier, the
intention to create EU-ASEAN FTA inter-regional is expressed clearly
by EU, following the recent EU approach to newer trade and investment
agreement, it is highly likely that future EU-ASEAN FTA/IPA to include
ICS mechanism. EU-Singapore and EU-Viet Nam IPAs were just the
starting point of the expansion. Multilateral investment court clauses
found in EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore IPAs likely to function to
enable ASEAN’s participation towards multilateral investment court.
This inter-regional approach in the future would ease up the negotiation
towards multilateral investment court at the global stage.
However, it is important to keep reminding that up until now there
is no empirical success of EU’s ICS because it is still in dormant stage
and practically ineffective. Despite the success in negotiating ICS
mechanism as a replacement of ordinary ISDS provision in recent
IPAs, EU Commission itself still struggling to convince EU Member
States about the viability of ICS mechanism. In recent case, CETA was
put on provisional entry into force excluding the investment part, this
is due to Belgium’s request for an opinion to ECJ with regard to ICS

N. Jansen Calamita, ‘The Challenge of Establishing a Multilateral Investment Tribunal at ICSID,’ (2017) 611 ICSID Review 32, 612.
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compatibility with EU law.64 Consequently, Belgium’s move delayed
the ratification process of CETA in general. Until whole ratification
process is completed ICS is a practically dormant paper tiger. This lack
of empirical proof and EU’s internal disagreement likely to motivate
other states to wait and see to decide whether to support and join forces
with the ISDS reformist through ICS.
Recent EU’s agreement concluded Japan65 in fact does not feature
any ICS provision or any investment protection provisions at all.
Investment matter under this agreement is a small part of a chapter
titled “Trade in services, investment liberalisation and electronic
commerce.”66 Thus, this approach can be seen as the inconsistency of
EU’s practice to promote ICS as the new mechanism to replace ISDS.
It is questionable why EU was able to push the conclusion of ICS with
Canada under CETA and pushes the US in TTIP negotiation with regard
to ICS mechanism, but entirely excluded Japan. Considering these
countries are also like-minded developed state, this inconsistency is such
an anomaly of EU practice. Thus, exclusion of ICS with Japan would
possible discourage some of ASEAN Member States’ engagement with
EU in terms of establishment ICS under respective IPAs, even would
create doubt about the formation multilateral investment court in the
long run.
In addition, some of the technical details of ICS also problematic
from the view of developing countries and LDCs. Such as, regarding
administration costs, to retain the members of Tribunal, each party
shall make a monthly expenditure to cover the retainer fee. It is not
known how exactly the amount in EU-Singapore and EU-Viet Nam
IPA, but elsewhere in TTIP, it was estimated 2000 Euro per individual
per month.67 This administrative cost would push prospect states to
conduct extensive cost and benefit calculation in incorporating ICS
IISD, ‘Belgium requests CJEU for an opinion on the compatibility of ICS in CETA
with EU law’ (IISD, 21 December 2017), <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/12/21/
belgium-requests-cjeu-for-an-opinion-on-the-compatibility-of-ics-in-ceta-with-eulaw/> accessed 13 March 2019.
65
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mechanism or joining multilateral investment court in the future. 68 One
huge constraint by developing the country and LDCs in facing ISDS, as
expressed by Thailand in UNICTRAL Working Group III is regarding
the capacity and financial constraint to face the ISDS litigation.69 Due
to the novelty of the working procedure, developing country and LDCs
might also facing difficulties in using ICS mechanism, thus training and
capacity building needs to be addressed.70 So far only two out of ten
ASEAN Member States have concluded a bilateral agreement with the
EU, these two are indeed exceptional minority. Currently, Indonesia is
still in the negotiation process of its own agreement with the EU, yet
reception towards ICS proposal remains inconclusive.71 Thus, from this
point we can observe that it would be difficult for the EU to achieve
uniform establishment of ICS throughout ASEAN, and consequently
the multilateral investment court.
V. CONCLUSION
Long established ISDS mechanism has been the subject of criticism
being impartial, lack of legitimacy, costly and lengthy procedure, small
pool of arbitrator, and inconsistent interpretation of rules. Yet, the
reform of ISDS was rather slow and gradual. The EU, after gaining
constitutional power to participate in the negotiation of international
investment agreement, pursued more ambitious trade and investment
cooperation with its partners. In its proposal with trading partners, the
EU took public inputs and criticism of traditional ISDS mechanism
into account. Based on the public input, EU then introduce a novel
mechanism labeled as ‘investment court system.’ It features strict rules
on standing tribunal members’ qualification and ethical standard, twotier proceeding to correct the erroneous decision and increase coherence,
Catherine Li, “The EU’s Proposal Regarding the Establishment of the Investment
Court System and the Response from Asia,” (2018) 943 Journal of World Trade 52,
965.
69
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European Commission, ‘Report of the 5th Round of Negotiation for a Free Trade
Agreement between EU and Indonesia’ < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/
july/tradoc_157137.pdf> accessed 8 March 2019.
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enhanced transparency, and third-party access.
This proposal began to be realised, incorporated within the texts of
economic partnership agreement and investment protection agreement
with EU’s trading partners, a couple of them are Singapore and Viet Nam.
These agreements serve as the working prototype of ICS in reality, with
EU’s final aim is to establish a multilateral investment court to replace
current arbitrators-ruled ISDS mechanism. In this paper, I have explained
that the inter-regional cooperation of ASEAN and the EU could serve
as a stepping-stone towards realising multilateral investment court.
The EU regards ASEAN as a strategic partner in its external economic
policies, and two of EU IPAs with the ASEAN Member States have
established the ICS. The next step needed is to enlarge the participation
of ASEAN Member States in making multilateral investment court.
EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore have a clause that would enable the
creation of multilateral investment court.
However, the challenges of such expansion coming from EU’s
internal dynamics as well as other’s state status quo attitude of developing
states. Belgium’s political move in asking an Opinion to ECJ delayed
overall ratification process of CETA, causing ICS to remain nonoperational. Recent conclusion of EU-Japan Comprehensive Economic
sans any ICS or ISDS mechanism demonstrated the inconsistency of
EU approach in promoting its ISDS reform agenda by ICS. We could
also point out that so-called ICS is a dormant paper tiger, the absence of
practical experience and lesson learned would be the biggest hindrance
towards multilateral investment court. Without the empirical proof
on how the mechanism would work practically, other prospective
EU’s partners, including ASEAN Member States, which comprises of
developing the country and LDCs could be skeptical about the agenda.
One of the main constraint of developing and LDCs are capacity and
financial constraint in engaging in ISDS proceeding, without addressing
this constrain, any reofrm is not really attractive. Thus, in order to chase
further expansion of multilateral investment court, the EU must settle
its own internal problem with ICS, and create an inclusive framework
for developing and LDCs to work with its novel proposal on investment
dispute mechanism.
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